By Joseph Baek

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most important organisations in the world, even if it rarely feels visible. It connects 166 governments through multilateral trade law (GATT 1994, GATS, TRIPS) and a shared system for negotiation and enforcement. Trade also happens at breathtaking scale: rules on tariffs, subsidies and market access can shift millions or billions in value, and global supply chains move roughly 11 billion tonnes of cargo by sea, with international shipping emitting about 700 million tonnes of CO₂. In other words, WTO choices don’t just shape “trade”; they shape the incentives that decide what gets produced, where, and at whose expense.
Those incentives have too often rewarded extraction while hiding the damage. Wealthy economies tend to import resources, materials and energy from poorer regions, effectively outsourcing environmental harm and rights risks. In Brazil, export-driven agricultural expansion over the last 20 years has driven deforestation and has been linked indirectly to over 700,000 premature deaths through increased air pollution in downwind communities. Rising demand for electronics and clean-energy technologies can deepen this pattern: the DRC has hosted notoriously rights-abusive mining facilities to supply cobalt, copper and other minerals, increasingly for electric-vehicle batteries. The result is not only environmental degradation, but also the social costs that travel with it — polluted water and air, labour exploitation, forced displacement and violence around high-value extraction. The WTO is not the single cause of these harms, but it can enable them indirectly by privileging rapid liberalisation and “cheaper inputs” without requiring that ecological and human costs be priced into trade decisions. It is not greed alone; it is the system that gives greed efficient pathways.
SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation) is equally implicated. Mining runoff in the DRC and agro-chemical leaching in Brazil contaminate the river systems that entire communities depend on for drinking water, irrigation and livelihoods. Trade rules that ignore these externalities effectively subsidise the poisoning of shared water sources — a direct contradiction of SDG 6’s commitment to safe water for all. The WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement and its sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) disciplines offer underused levers: importing members could, within WTO-consistent bounds, use standards to demand that supply-chain actors meet minimum water-safety thresholds, converting a norm of global commerce into a practical safeguard for downstream communities.
That is exactly why the WTO is also a potential solution. For SDG 1 (No Poverty), Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) and Aid for Trade can reduce structural disadvantages facing least-developed countries. Haiti shows what is at stake: in 2024 its GDP shrank by 4.2% amid political instability and gang violence, and around 36.2% of Haitians were living on less than $2.15 per day (worse than in 2021). WTO-enabled reforms cannot replace domestic stabilisation, but they can remove predictable barriers: lower tariffs for Haitian exports (textiles, coffee, agriculture), stronger discipline on trade-distorting subsidies that undercut local producers, and targeted Aid for Trade investment in ports, roads, standards compliance and supply-chain training. For SDG 7 and SDG 12, Malawi’s data shows how energy and production lock together: only about 15.6% had electricity access in 2023 (around 37% urban and 2% rural), while biomass provided roughly 94% of energy consumption, driving deforestation and soil erosion. Aid for Trade can help finance renewable infrastructure such as solar mini-grids and help “greener” goods reach expanding international markets. Finally, SDG 16 and 17 depend on credible rules: since 1995 the dispute system has handled over 600 disputes and issued over 350 rulings, yet the Appellate Body has been paralysed since 2019 (with the MPIA — 56 members — only a partial workaround). The 2022 Fisheries Subsidies Agreement shows the WTO can still deliver environmental progress: by early 2025, 89 of the required 111 members had ratified it, and entry into force would activate the WTO Fish Fund to support developing members’ enforcement capacity.
Sustainable development cannot be achieved in isolation. Supply chains, emissions and inequality cross borders, so trade rules must stop rewarding the export of harm. The WTO is fragile — but it remains one of the few places where sustainability can be translated into shared, enforceable incentives, fast enough to matter.
